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Glossary 
 
DiP  Decision-in-Principle (in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act) 
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment 
E.ON  German energy company. The company owned 34 per cent of 
Fennovoima, but it pulled out and sold its business in Finland. 
Fennovoima  Power company established in 2007. It plans to build a new NPP unit 
at Pyhäjoki. 
Fortum  Energy company, the State of Finland is the biggest shareholder with 
an over 50 per cent holding. 
FPH  Fortum Power and Heat Ltd (formerly IVO), part of Fortum 
Consortium, operates the NPP at Loviisa. FPH owns 25,8 per cent of 
TVO 
IVO  Imatran Voima Ltd, 100 per cent state-owned power company 
established in 1932. Known as Fortum Power and Heat since 1998 
MEE  Ministry of Employment and the Economy (formely Ministry of Trade 
and Industry) 
MTV3  Finnish media company 
NPP  nuclear power plant 
Pohjolan Voima  Energy company that owns the majority of TVO shares, the forest 
industry companies UPM Kymmene and Stora Enso are the biggest 
shareholders of Pohjolan Voima 
Posiva  Nuclear waste management company owned by TVO (60 per cent) 
and FPH (40 per cent), established in 1995 
SNF  spent nuclear fuel 
STUK  Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
tU  tons of uranium 
TVO  Teollisuuden Voima Ltd, operates the NPP at Olkiluoto site in 
Eurajoki 
UPM Kymmene  Bio and forest industry company, the biggest shareholder of Pohjolan 
Voima 
YLE  Finnish Public Broadcasting Company 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today Finland is often regarded as one of the few success stories in implementing the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The decisions by the government in 2000 and by 
Parliament in 2001 regarding the Decision-in-Principle were a turning point. The construction 
of the ONKALO Underground Rock Characterization Facility at the Olkiluoto site in the 
municipality of Eurajoki was started in 2004. Parliament has also ratified two expansions of 
capacity of the repository, in 2002 and 2010. Due to this progress Finnish nuclear waste 
policy and SNF management have been praised using words such as “successful” 
(Macfarlane, 2003, 797), “democratic” (Riley, 2004, 83), “relatively smooth and steady 
progress” (Vandenbosch & Vandenbosch, 2007, 238) and “advanced” (Feiveson et al., 2011). 
According to Alley and Alley (2013, 316) “Finland also appears to be in the repository home-
stretch”. 
Therefore it can be argued that Finland has taken its national responsibility for the final 
disposal of SNF seriously. However, national responsibility is a relatively new principle in the 
Finnish nuclear waste policy as until December 1996 SNF from Loviisa nuclear power plant 
(NPP) was transported to Russia. The prohibition of export and import of nuclear waste, 
which is the most palpable expression of national responsibility, became effective due to the 
amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act of 1987.  
The principle of national responsibility has two sides: Firstly, it addresses how a country 
utilizing nuclear power takes care of nuclear waste produced in the country and secondly it 
deals  with  the  rights  of  a  country  to  forbid  final  disposal  of  spent  fuel  produced  in  other  
countries  on  its  territory.  (Cramér  et  al.,  2009,  17).  For  example,  in  Sweden  responsibility  
according to Cramér et al. (2009, 17), is a combination of producer responsibility, 
governmental regulation and forbidding the disposal of foreign waste. The Finnish application 
is very similar to that in Sweden. This division of labour and liabilities is deemed pronounced 
and therefore seen as one factor explaining the progress (Rasilainen & Vuori, 2002, 9). 
In practice national responsibility is understood to refer to one repository only per country1. A 
repository is expensive and deciding on the site is more than problematic. Therefore the waste 
                                               
1 In the United States there have been plans to have more than one repository for spent fuel 
from commercial NPPs. In 1982 the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of the United States outlined 
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producers have collaborated, either under a governmental or private agency (see NWTRB, 
2009), to find one site for all SNF produced in one country. For example, as of the end of 
2007 spent fuel inventories in the United States covered 61,000 tons of heavy metal and in 
Canada 38,400 tons. In Sweden the amount was 5,400 tons. (Feiveson et al., 2011) These 
countries plan to have one repository for commercially produced SNF. In Finland the amount 
was 1,600 tons. Nevertheless the second repository was accepted as a viable option by the 
Finnish government in 2010. 
National responsibility has therefore encountered a new socio-technical challenge. It is 
possible that in the future there could be two separate repositories for SNF in Finland. This 
would be unique by international comparison. The challenge emerged when the nuclear 
power company Fennovoima started planning its NPP and SNF management in 2007. 
Fennovoima wanted to cooperate with the nuclear waste management company Posiva in the 
final disposal of SNF at the planned repository at the Olkiluoto site. Fennovoima argued that 
the role of Posiva was to manage all spent nuclear fuel produced in Finland and that for this 
purpose a single site was approved. According to Fennovoima this is compatible with the 
national interest. Posiva has rejected this and stated that its objective is to take care of SNF 
produced by its owners only, i.e. the power companies Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) and 
Fortum  Power  and  Heat  (FPH)2. Furthermore, Posiva has argued that there is not enough 
capacity in the bedrock at the Olkiluoto site. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the interests, resources and tactics of the key actors 
negotiating the development of the joint final disposal of SNF in Finland. The research 
question is as follows: How was the spent nuclear fuel management of Fennovoima, and 
especially the question of collaboration with Posiva, shaped by socio-technical arguments? 
The  key  actors  are  Posiva,  Fennovoima  and  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  the  Employment  and  
Economy (MEE). Some other actors, such as the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) and the municipality of Eurajoki, are also involved in the analysis, but they 
                                                                                                                                                   
that the quantity of waste to be emplaced in the first repository was limited to 70,000 metric 
tons of heavy metal. A future second repository was planned to be located in the eastern 
United States. However, in accordance to the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 
the requirement to pursue a site for a second repository was suspended. (Vandenbosch & 
Vandenbosch, 2007, 39–42.) 
2 Fortum Power and Heat (FPH) is part of Fortum consortium. 
7 
 
are not in the main focus as they were not among the most active players of the controversy. 
The main controversy was between Posiva and Fennovoima at this phase of the siting, as 
Fennovoima attempted to gain access to Posiva’s disposal project and to dispose of its SNF at 
Olkiluoto. The rejecting attitude of Posiva against Fennovoima may have sheltered the 
municipality of Eurajoki and thus perhaps made it more passive in its own activity regarding 
the issue. MEE due to its responsibility for overall supervision of nuclear energy policy was a 
kind of a mediator between the companies. 
The research data consists of publicly available documents and newspaper and internet 
articles related to the issue. A number of different newspapers and internet sources were 
reviewed to avoid possible one-sidedness if only one newspaper had been used as a source. 
On the other hand, readers should be aware that, as the data is based on public sources, 
documents written for the internal use of the actors could have revealed new aspects of the 
case study. Interviews were not conducted as the controversy had already continued for 
several years before the gathering of the data for the case study data was started. Compared to 
interviews newspapers were regarded as a more reliable source to gather the main arguments 
voiced publicly by different actors. The analysis covers the time period from 2007 to 2013. In 
2007 the establishment of Fennovoima opened up the controversy, which seemed to have 
reached a more tranquil stage in 2013 after the final report of the Working Party aimed at 
considering different options under the command of the Ministry of the Employment and 
Economy.  
The paper is empirically oriented, but ideas from actor power in interactions are applied as a 
framework. The debate and negotiations on the development of the joint final disposal of SNF 
in Finland are seen as socio-technical challenge, i.e. as an issue where social and technical 
aspects merge. The debate on a “national solution” is a combination where conflicting 
interpretations regarding rock capacity assessment, policy decisions and power relations are 
entangled. We will analyse how the dispute between Fennovoima and Posiva evolved from an 
initial project, transformed and became a retransformed project. These refer to different stages 
of the dispute which evolved as a result  of the social  activity of the main actors and events 
beyond their control. The first stage, the initial project, refers to debate conducted between 
Fennovoima and Posiva in 2007 and 2008 in the Finnish media after the announcement by 
Fennovoima that they would collaborate with Posiva in the final disposal of SNF at Olkiluoto.  
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The second stage, the transformed project, refers to Fennovoima’s application for a Decision-
in-Principle on an NPP unit and the Decision-in-Principle issued in May 2010 by the 
government. Fennovoima submitted the application in 2009. It included Fennovoima’s plan 
for spent nuclear fuel management. The government offered Fennovoima two options for its 
SNF management. The company was either to negotiate an agreement with the existing 
licensees under waste management obligation (i.e. TVO and FPH) or submit an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Program in respect of a final disposal facility of its 
own for spent nuclear fuel. Fennovoima was obliged to take action by 30 June 2016. 
The third stage, the retransformed project which reflects the continuing dynamics of the 
controversy, refers to the Working Party established by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy in March 2012. The objective of the Working Party was to guide the joint report of 
the power companies regarding the options for the final disposal of nuclear fuel (MEE, 2013, 
3). The final report of the Working Party, published in January 2013, suggested that 
Fennovoima and Posiva should continue negotiations on a commercial basis. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section Two the theoretical framework of the 
paper is introduced. The analysis of actor power is based on ideas by Roger Few (2002). The 
crucial point of the framework section is to introduce how actor power can be applied in 
analysing socio-technical combinations. In Section Three the Finnish nuclear waste policy 
and responsibilities of the main actors are introduced. This is vital, as the shareholders of 
Posiva, i.e. TVO and FPH, are according to the Nuclear Energy Act licensees under waste 
management obligation whereas Posiva and Fennovoima are not. The status or non-status of a 
licensee under waste management obligation is one important resource in the story. In Section 
Four the research data is analysed in terms of these three stages. In Section Five our 
conclusions suggest that national responsibility for the final disposal of SNF is re-interpreted 
in Finland as the option of the second repository was indeed allowed. The controversy that 
became troublesome for the whole nuclear energy sector in Finland was solved temporarily 
by a classic method, i.e. driving the conflicting parties around one table and closing the doors. 
Due to the conflict the identity of Posiva as a private company was accentuated. Finnish 
nuclear waste policy continues to be based on actor-specific policies. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The dispute evolving due to Fennovoima’s need to plan its spent nuclear fuel management is 
a good example of a technological project in the making. The issue of Fennovoima’s nuclear 
fuel management is perceived in the paper as a relationship between social choices and 
technical  options  that  are  still  open.  The  options  are  either  to  collaborate  with  Posiva  on  a  
joint repository at Olkiluoto to extend it or to build a second repository elsewhere in Finland. 
Fennovoima strongly prefers the former. The issue discussed, however, includes more 
complicated discussions than merely a choice by Fennovoima. For example, the balance of 
power in Finnish nuclear waste policy, the status of Posiva and the total disposal capacity 
(technically) available in the Olkiluoto bedrock are touched on. Therefore the issue is 
perceived as a socio-technical question. 
Robert Few’s idea of actor-power is applied as a tool to analyse the actors and their roles in 
the socio-technical change of the nuclear waste project. We think of actors as constantly 
engaging each other in a group and also withholding non-human forms. (Latour, 2005.) The 
actors, with a significant role in the project attempt to mobilize and stabilize what Law and 
Callon call the “global network”. This stabilization can be done by obtaining resources with 
which it is possible to control and build a project. The “global network” refers to a 
relationship between the actor and its neighbour and further between the neighbour and the 
next. “This network generates in space, a period of time and set of resources in which 
innovation takes place.” The space can be called the “negotiation space” (Law & Callon 1992, 
21.) The project can therefore be conceived of as balancing acts in which elements both inside 
and outside of the project can be seen as parallel. (Law & Callon, 1992, 22) 
We see the dispute as a project influenced by the events and strategies that shape the global 
network.  (Law  &  Callon  1992,  22)  Hence  we  want  to  look  more  closely  at  the  negotiation  
space or negotiation arena and its actors. Because in their networks the actors wield power, 
we found it useful to use the analytical tool by Few in order to examine the different actors’ 
influence on the project.  
Actor-power rests on theories of power.  Few introduces a “working model” of power which 
includes three key points as follows:  1) “power is dispersed throughout society, rather than 
concentrated solely in the hands of the “dominant”, 2) “power is entangled in social relations 
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between agents that differs in their interests, identities, and resources”, 3) “Social power is 
articulated through complex mechanisms including tactics of negotiation” (Few 2002, 31).  
Power can be seen to be wielded in the planning arena when an actor intervenes in a social 
event (Few, 2002). Action refers to putting forward an initiative or presenting an argument. 
According to Few, the characteristics of power are formed by motives, resources and tactics. 
Few argues (2002, 33, 37) that by analysing the motives, resources and tactics of different 
groups it  is  possible to gain a better understanding of the effects of social  power and power 
relations, in this case a study on technological choices. We will be able to look at how and by 
whom the problem is positioned and how the project can be influenced by different events 
and strategies.   (Law & Callon, 1992, 22) In Few’s terminology motives refer to the actors’ 
reasons for their actions. The actions may include strategic objectives and articulations of 
identity. However, instead of motives, we understand these as merely actors’ interests, which 
are articulated in public debate. Analysis of actors’ motives would have required a different 
research method. Power resources and tactics were used in accordance with Few’s thoughts. 
Power resources are not only personal skills and connections but also more structural features 
such as discourses. Power tactics refers to strategic social action that draws on the resources 
and which the actor use in power systems. Tactics may include alliance formation, 
enrollment, persuasion, manipulation, compromise and exclusion. (Few 2002, 33.) 
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3. FINNISH NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY 
Finland experienced a strong nuclear renaissance in the 2000s (see Litmanen and Kojo, 2011; 
Kojo, 2009). In 2002 Parliament voted in favour of a new NPP unit. The applicant, TVO, 
signed a turn-key contract with Areva in 2003 for the construction of a 1600 MW European 
Pressurized Reactor (Olkiluoto 3 unit).  Construction at the Olkiluoto site began in 2005. At 
the same time, in 2003–2006, a new debate on building additional nuclear power capacity was 
started by the spokesmen of Finnish energy-intensive industry. Some foreign power 
companies were also interested in investing in nuclear power production in Finland. For 
example, E.ON and Vattenfall announced their interest in 2006 and 2007. 
TVO and Fortum, which had collaborated in lobbying for the Olkiluoto 3 NPP application, 
decided this time to proceed on their own. TVO submitted an application to the government in 
April 2008 and Fortum in February 2009. The third applicant, Fennovoima, submitted its NPP 
application in January 2009. Furthermore, Posiva submitted two applications: The first in 
April 2008 for a Decision-in-Principle on an extension to the final disposal facility of SNF for 
Olkiluoto 4 and then the second in March 2009 for a Decision-in-Principle on an extension to 
the final disposal facility of SNF for Loviisa 3. 
E.ON, which had failed to acquire a property in Loviisa for a NPP unit of its own, became the 
second biggest shareholder in Fennovoima. E.ON was also interested in collaboration with 
TVO due to the NPP siting issue, but this collaboration never materialized. (Pylkkönen, 
Litmanen and Kojo, 2008, 13–18.) Thus the networks established around the three companies 
TVO, Fortum and Fennovoima and their shareholders competed for political support for their 
own NPP applications in 2008–2010. However, in the issue of the final disposal of SNF only 
two ‘global networks’ existed as Posiva is jointly owned by TVO and FPH.  
The Finnish government made the decision on additional nuclear build in May 2010. All three 
NPP applications and two applications for the extension of the final disposal facility were 
addressed at the same time. The applications by TVO and Fennovoima were granted a 
positive Decision-in-Principle, but that by Fortum was rejected. (TEM, 2010a.) After voting 
Parliament ratified the governmental decisions in July 2010. 
The Decision-in-Principle of Fennovoima NPP included requirements regarding SNF 
management. The government required that within six years Fennovoima was obliged either 
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to  negotiate  and  sign  an  agreement  with  the  existing  licensees,  i.e.  TVO  and  FPH,  under  a  
waste  management  obligation,  or  to  submit  an  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (EIA)  
Program concerning a final disposal repository for SNF of its own. If the company should fail 
to  fulfill  the  requirement,  the  government  would  not  issue  the  construction  licence  for  the  
NPP unit (M 4/2010 vp, 16).  
As Parliament ratified the DiP for Fennovoima, it also accepted a resolution by the Finance 
Committee regarding nuclear waste policy. According to the resolution Parliament required 
that the government exert pressure on Posiva, its owners and Fennovoima to initiate during 
2010 clarifications and negotiations towards a national final disposal solution aiming at a joint 
national final disposal solution also including the final disposal of spent fuel from the 
Fennovoima NPP unit. (TaVM 13/2010 vp, 40; MEE, 2012a.)  
The  new  government  formed  by  Prime  Minister  Jyrki  Katainen  (of  the  National  Coalition  
Party) in June 2011 included this resolution in the government programme. According to the 
programme “the government will make decisions concerning the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel after the completion of necessary surveys by seeking a national solution in 
accordance with the Parliament’s decision“ (Government Programme, 2011, 71). Thus the 
government aimed not at a joint national solution as Parliament had required, but at a national 
solution.  In  the  press  (Satakunnan Kansa, 18 June 2011) the national solution was still 
interpreted to refer to the concentration of final disposal on one site, i.e. Olkiluoto, but 
Minister Jyri Häkämies (of the National Coalition Party) noted that ‘national solution’ did not 
mean  that  nuclear  waste  produced  by  Fennovoima  had  to  fit  into  the  final  disposal  site  of  
Posiva. Nor did it mean the nationalization of Posiva or changes to the legislation. Häkämies 
also commented that a joint national solution had been an option in the negotiations of the 
government programme, but the chosen wording, i.e. national solution, “allowed one train to 
travel in one direction and another in the opposite direction”.  (Tekniikka & Talous, 12 
August 2011). Thus, the government programme was deliberately more flexible than the 
parliamentary resolution. 
However, as the dispute between Posiva and Fennovoima could not be resolved by the actors 
themselves, the Governmental Committee on Economic Policy outlined in February 2012 that 
the Ministry of Employment and Economy could take action in determining the different 
licensees under a waste management obligation to conduct nuclear waste management jointly 
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if the conditions stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act were indeed met (MEE, 2012a). For 
this purpose the Ministry established a Working Party which held its first meeting in March 
2012 (MEE, 2012b). The final report including statements by STUK and the Energy Market 
Authority was published in January 2013. The Working Party consisted of representatives of 
the MEE, TVO, Fortum, Posiva and Fennovoima. The host municipalities of nuclear facilities 
or other stakeholders were neither represented nor given a voice in the Working Party. 
A licensee under a waste management obligation is defined in the Finnish legislation.  
According to paragraph 9 of the Nuclear Energy Act “[a] licensee whose operations generate 
or have generated nuclear waste (licensee under a waste management obligation) shall be 
responsible for all nuclear waste management measures and their appropriate preparation, 
as well as for their costs (waste management obligation).”  
In practice an applicant becomes a licensee when the government grants a licence to operate a 
nuclear facility generating nuclear waste. Before that a separate construction licence 
application is required. Thus an applicant granted a positive Decision-in-Principle under the 
terms of the Nuclear Energy Act is not yet licensee under a waste management obligation. 
For  example,  Fennovoima  was  granted  the  DiP  for  a  NPP  unit  in  2010,  but  so  far  the  
company has not even applied for a construction licence. Neither is Posiva a licensee under a 
waste management obligation as the operations of Posiva do not generate nuclear waste. 
The definition of a licensee under a waste management obligation has consequences for the 
story as according to paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act “[t]he Ministry of Trade and 
Industry may order various licensees under waste management obligation to undertake waste 
management measures jointly, if by doing so safety can be increased and or costs can be 
substantially reduced or if any other weighty reason so requires.” MEE considered applying 
paragraph 29 and its implications (MEE, 2009, 2; 2010b), but was reluctant to apply the 
paragraph. 
Before the formation of the abovementioned Working Party was announced the Ministry of 
Justice was asked to issue a statement on paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act in relation 
to the Finnish Constitution. According to the statement the objective of the legislator seemed 
to have been, that if the requirements of the regulation are met, fairly extreme requirements 
regarding collaboration can be imposed. The Ministry of Justice concluded that the option of 
14 
 
imposing mandatory collaboration seemed not to be an issue of making a legal stipulation but 
rather an isolated administrative decision. (Ministry of Justice, 2012, 2.) In other words the 
Ministry of Justice, in contrast to the MEE, made the interpretation that collaboration can be 
made compulsory as long as the obligations are not completely unreasonable for the parties. 
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4. ANALYSIS  
4.1 The initial project: A daydream of easy access to the national solution 
The establishment of Fennovoima was announced in June 2007. Immediately after that the 
issue of nuclear waste management appeared in the headlines of the Finnish press3. The 
tactics of Fennovoima were focused on alliance formation as the company was interested in 
collaboration with Posiva. According to the spokesman of the stainless steel company 
Outokumpu, which was one of the main actors establishing Fennovoima, the objective of 
Fennovoima was to discuss with Posiva on final disposal. 
However, Posiva was distant and cautious in its tactics. The then CEO of Posiva stated that 
the task of Posiva was to dispose of the spent fuel produced by its owners (Talous-Sanomat, 
15 June 2007). In fact Posiva had already announced in April 20074, i.e. before the 
establishment of Fennovoima, that Posiva had no connections with E.ON and their possible 
NPP project in Finland (Posiva, 2007). Thus, Posiva emphasized its identity as a private 
company with a specific task determined solely by the shareholders. The then CEO of TVO, 
as the representative of the main shareholder of Posiva, stated that they were not very 
enthusiastic, but that TVO was ready to discuss. (Talous-Sanomat, 15 June 2007.) Thus the 
status and identity of Posiva as part of Finnish nuclear waste policy were immediately in 
focus.  
The media also asked the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which is in charge of Finnish 
nuclear waste policy, for its position. A civil servant of the Ministry stated that the main 
principle was that the state would not interfere in the game, but the industry had to take care 
of nuclear waste management. (Taloussanomat, 18 June 2007.) The Ministry did not want to 
apply paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act, which can be seen as the last resort, although, 
according to the Act, the Ministry can compel the licensees under waste management 
obligation to cooperate (See Section 3). Therefore the tactics of the Ministry were non-
intervention at this point. Their interest was to urge the industrial actors to resolve the issue 
                                               
3 The data of this section comprises selected newspaper articles focusing on the dispute 
between Fennovoima and Posiva. 
4 TVO and Fortum announced in April 2007 that they would start EIA procedures for new 
NPP units. 
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themselves. The Ministry did not want not to interfere with or upset the balance of power 
stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
However, the industrial actors did not concur with each other. On the contrary, the tactics of 
Posiva became clearly exclusive already in September 2007. At that time Posiva announced 
that the company would not negotiate with Fennovoima on final disposal.   (Kauppalehti, 28 
September, 2007.) The status and identity of Posiva were used as a resource. The owners of 
Posiva, i.e. TVO and FPH, rejected the negotiations and furthermore Posiva stated that 
Fennovoima had made a totally wrong interpretation regarding Posiva. The CEO of TVO 
stated that Posiva as a company could not be nationalized (Kauppalehti, 28 September, 2007). 
Posiva  clearly  wanted  to  be  identified  as  a  private  company  implementing  a  task  for  its  
owners and not as a common national agency with a national mission. Posiva wanted to shed 
the mantle of a national nuclear waste agency which Fennovoima wanted to put on Posiva.  
Posiva also interpreted paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act. According to Posiva it could 
not be obliged to cooperate unless the Act was amended in accordance with the legislative 
procedure of the Finnish Constitution. (Kauppalehti, 28 September, 2007.) Thus the 
conflicting parties used the same resource, paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act, but their 
interpretations were opposite. Posiva was protecting its back as it referred to the company’s 
constitutional rights in owning and controlling assets, i.e. the repository under construction. 
In October 2007 Fennovoima attempted to apply a collaborative approach towards Posiva as 
Fennovoima proposed negotiations between the actors, but according to the press Posiva did 
not even reply. Fennovoima had also a new resource as it had acquired property at Olkiluoto, 
located in the vicinity of the Posiva repository. Fennovoima was ready to hand over this 
property, 24 hectares of land, for the disposal of SNF produced in Finland. The tactics based 
on this resource were two-dimensional, first persuasive and then oppressive.  Fennovoima’s 
willingness to donate the property was initially meant to be a goodwill gesture persuading 
Posiva to start the negotiations, but later the tactics became much harder. 
In a memorandum5 submitted to the MEE Fennovoima (2010, 19–20, 25–31) outlined that if a 
joint repository at Olkiluoto was not available either because of Posiva’s rejection or the 
                                               
5 According to Fennovoima (2010, 3) the objective of the memorandum was to provide 
specified background regarding options of final disposal of SNF. The primary option was the 
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state’s unwillingness to apply paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act Fennovoima’s main 
alternative plan was to construct a second repository at Olkiluoto. It would be located on the 
abovementioned property. Furthermore, the property and the bedrock underneath, which were 
controlled by Fennovoima, would not be available to Posiva for free of charge. Thus the tactic 
was to put pressure on both Posiva and MEE.  
Fennovoima emphasized that nuclear waste management is a national issue. According to 
Fennovoima Posiva was established to take care of the final disposal of all nuclear waste 
generated in Finland. The then CEO of Fennovoima revealed that their assumption was right 
from the beginning that Posiva would take care of their waste, too.  (Länsi-Suomi, 2 
November 2007; Helsingin Sanomat, 2 December 2007.)  
New arguments were evinced in the escalating debate as Posiva announced that there was no 
room at Olkiluoto site for nuclear waste produced by Fennovoima. Posiva argued that 
according to the EIA Report the maximum capacity was 9000 tU. Posiva urged Fennovoima 
to study the bedrock at the candidate host sites of its planned NPP unit. (Kauppalehti, 13 
November 2007.) According to Posiva each nuclear power company itself had to take care of 
SNF produced by the company. Furthermore, Posiva rejected Fennovoima’s interpretation 
that Olkiluoto would be the disposal site for all nuclear waste produced in Finland. (Länsi-
Suomi, 2 November 2007). Thus Posiva emphasized the principle of licensee-specificy as the 
line of Finnish nuclear waste policy.  
Although the main parties had drifted into a public dispute, the representative of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry still expected the industry to be able to solve disposal issue “rationally” 
and thus the Ministry held its tactics of non-interference. According to a civil servant the 
Ministry would consider the issue only when the DiP applications were submitted. However, 
the representative of the Ministry stated that the construction of a second repository would be 
“horribly expensive, which hardly would be the best option for Finland”. (Länsi-Suomi, 2 
November 2007.) Thus at least some kind of understanding for the interests of Fennovoima 
regarding a national solution could be seen in the thinking of the Ministry. 
                                                                                                                                                   
joint repository at Olkiluoto in collaboration with Posiva either on voluntary basis or obliged 
by the state. The number one alternative option was to construct an own repository at 
Olkiluoto, possibly at two layers due to limited area available. The last option was to look for 
an entirely new site. The memorandum (Fennovoima, 2010) was dated on 31 March 2010. 
That is two weeks before the government decided on nuclear new build.  
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TVO and Posiva submitted their DiP applications for an OL4 NPP unit and expansion of the 
final disposal repository in April 2008. At the same time TVO indicated that the company was 
not interested in discussing final disposal with Fennovoima. Posiva was stated to be “our 
solution”, reserved for their own use only as there was room for waste from possible new 
NPP units of TVO. (Satakunnan Kansa, 26 April 2008.) 
According to a director of Fennovoima the above-mentioned outline of TVO was awkward. 
(Satakunnan Kansa, 26 April 2008.) He had already earlier criticized Posiva of manufacturing 
obstacles as it was clear that final disposal was a national, not a company-specific issue 
(Helsingin Sanomat, 13 December 2007). Fennovoima still believed that one final disposal 
site was enough for Finland, as also in other countries. Furthermore, according to the director 
the owners of Posiva would receive enormous income from Fennovoima. Compensation was 
part of the tactics of persuasion by Fennovoima. Holding on to the nuclear power oligopoly 
was however, according to the director of Fennovoima, more important for the owners of 
Posiva than the income from Fennovoima. The state decision-making power was seen as a 
resource of Fennovoima as the director was confident that the state would determine the lines 
of Finnish nuclear waste policy. (Satakunnan Kansa, 26 April 2008.) 
Now the state also entered the debate. Mauri Pekkarinen (of the Centre Party of Finland), the 
then Minister of the Trade and Industry, stated that the statement of TVO represented only the 
interests of the company regarding the role of Posiva. The Minister pointed out that the state 
had not yet outlined the issue. Hence the Minister suggested that the state might have a 
different opinion on the status of Posiva6. Furthermore, if necessary, the Ministry was vested 
with  the  power  to  compel  Posiva  to  cooperate  with  Fennovoima.  (Satakunnan Kansa, 26 
April 2008.) Thus, once again paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act was applied as a 
resource. The interpretation of Minister Pekkarinen was in line with that of Fennovoima. In 
another interview two weeks later, the Minister repeated that the state could intervene, but his 
wish was that no coercion would be needed. (Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 10 May 2008.) The 
tactics  of  the  Ministry  were  still  based  on  keeping  out  of  the  issue  although a  warning  of  a  
harder policy line was now pronounced. 
                                               
6 In March 2008  Minister Jyri Häkämies (of theNational Coalition Party), who was then 
responsible for duties related to state ownership steering stated that the state would exert no 
influence over Fortum in this issue (Seura, 2008, 20). The Prime Minister’s Office, i.e. the 
State of Finland, is the biggest shareholder in Fortum (with 50.76% of the shares). 
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In 2008 Posiva submitted an EIA programme regarding the expansion of the final disposal 
repository. As Fennovoima considered that Posiva’s project would influence its own NPP 
project,  Fennovoima submitted a statement to the MEE in June 2008. The aim was pressure 
Posiva into considering the Fennovoima plan. In the statement the main resource of 
Fennovoima was the interpretation of Finnish nuclear waste policy decisions regarding the 
number of disposal sites. Fennovoima argued that a joint repository at Olkiluoto for all 
nuclear waste producers operating in Finland was the only option in line with social 
acceptance. According to Fennovoima “the decisions by the Council of State and Parliament 
during the last 25 years have aimed at and noted that disposal of all spent nuclear fuel 
generated in Finland to one single disposal site is in consonant with the overall good of the 
society” (Fennovoima, 2008, 1). Thus Fennovoima applied nuclear waste policy decisions as 
a resource as it interpreted those in accordance with its own interests. The interpretation also 
addressed the status of Posiva’s repository as Fennovoima announced that Posiva was not 
unequivocal enough on the status of the repository as a joint final disposal facility. 
Fennovoima required Posiva to describe in the EIA programme how Eurajoki was chosen to 
be the final disposal site for nuclear waste from the Finnish NPP units and what the status of 
the repository would be regarding the final disposal of SNF of other actors’ than the current 
owners’. 
Fennovoima also appealed to the EIA Act. According to Fennovoima it was impractical and 
deceptive that Posiva was limiting the disposal capacity of the repository to 12000 tU. 
Fennovoima argued that the minimum capacity considered should be at least 18000 tU to 
cater  for  SNF  generated  by  the  NPP  units  that  were  under  planning.  Fennovoima  also  
repeated that the company controlled a property called Lastenmaan tila at Olkiluoto. 
According to Fennovoima the expansion plan of the Posiva repository was partly located at 
the abovementioned property, which Fennovoima was ready to hand over for the disposal of 
SNF generated in Finland. (Fennovoima, 2008.) 
In the statement Fennovoima described its tactics as collaboration-oriented, but as the 
attempts of the company to initiate negotiations with Posiva had failed, some frustration was 
expressed between the lines. The tone of the statement was also to some extent more 
peremptory and no longer merely persuasive. As described above, the parties had not 
converged at all in the negotiations on the joint repository. Therefore Fennovoima attempted 
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to appeal to the MEE as a contact authority of the EIA procedure and to gain access to 
Posiva’s project. 
However,  a  civil  servant  of  MEE  stated  that  the  Ministry  could  not  and  had  no  grounds  to  
compel Posiva to increase the disposal capacity to more than Posiva and those under nuclear 
waste obligation had suggested in the application (Satakunnan Kansa, 23 August 2008). The 
argument was given in a newspaper interview only. In its statement on Posiva’s EIA 
programme MEE evinced no arguments for the rejection of the proposal for increased 
capacity of 18000 tU (MEE, 2008). Thus the increased disposal capacity required by 
Fennovoima was rejected in the frames of the EIA procedure as it failed to get support from 
the MEE. 
At  this  point  the  representative  of  the  municipality  of  Eurajoki,  the  chair  of  the  municipal  
government Matti Valtonen (of the Social Democratic Party) announced that the municipality 
was aware of the interests of the new power company and that there had been some informal 
discussions but Eurajoki was not enthusiastic about concentrating final disposal in its area. As 
previously, the municipality wanted to retain its right of veto7 on  the  expansion  of  the  
repository. The municipality spokesman also warned that the state should not take any 
coercive decisions in this issue. (Satakunnan Kansa, 7 September 2008). Thus Eurajoki as the 
host municipality of the repository was also reluctant to further the interests of Fennovoima. 
 
Summary 
Fennovoima’s wish for self-evident inclusion in the national solution at Olkiluoto faded away. 
The tactics of alliance formation and persuasion did not work as planned, but Posiva excluded 
Fennovoima, the competitor of its owners, from the Olkiluoto site. First Posiva referred to the 
status of the company but then it also started to argue that there was no room for 
Fennovoima’s SNF in the Olkiluoto bedrock. As the network around Fennovoima did not 
have resources to control the issue of final disposal it failed to start the negotiations on a 
voluntary basis with Posiva and its owners, not to mention reaching a compromise. Therefore 
Fennovoima needed to invoke paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act again to keep the 
                                               
7 The municipality has right of veto only on the expansion of the repository, not on the whole 
final disposal project it already approved in January 2000. 
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package around its NPP application project together. The MEE urged the contending parties 
to start negotiations on a voluntary basis but it also implied that the state could compel the 
parties to negotiate on collaboration. Although this did not help, no further measures were 
taken. Hence, the Ministry held itself aloof from the dispute. 
 
4.2 Transformed project: Dispute concerning a single common site and national solution 
As described  in  Section  4.1,  the  issue  of  the  development  of  a  joint  national  repository  had  
been debated more than one and half years before Fennovoima submitted the DiP application8 
to the Council of State in January 2009. During that time the “national solution” was already 
badly stuck.  
The primary interest of Fennovoima was to ensure a positive Decision-in-Principle for its 
NPP application. Therefore it needed to convince the politicians that it could take care of SNF 
management,  too.  The  easiest  way  was  to  refer  to  the  final  disposal  plans  by  Posiva  with  
collaborative tactics aiming at alliance -formation. Fennovoima outlined in the application 
that  its  objective  was  to  “develop and implement the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
together with other Finnish operators that are under a nuclear waste management 
obligation” (Fennovoima, 2009b, 315). Fennovoima also argued that the company “had been 
actively involved in the sector with the aim of establishing close relationship with other 
operators and key interest groups” (Fennovoima, 2009a, 100). However, at the same time it 
was added that if necessary the MEE in accordance with paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act could compel the licensees to collaborate on nuclear waste management. Thus 
Fennovoima relied on support from the State in resolving the dispute (See also Public 
Broadcasting Company YLE, 14 January, 2009). This reminder regarding paragraph 29 was 
                                               
8 The data in this section consists of two Supplements of the Fennovoima DiP application of 
2009 and Posiva’s statement on the Fennovoima DiP application (Posiva, 2009). The former, 
Supplement 2B (Fennovoima, 2009a) focuses on the general significance of the nuclear 
power plant project and one of its chapters was specifically about nuclear waste management. 
The latter, Supplement 5B (Fennovoima, 2009b), is entitled “Nuclear power plant fuel and 
waste management”. It is a general description of Fennovoima’s plans and of the methods 
available for nuclear waste management. It covers the management of low and medium-level 
nuclear waste, of spent nuclear fuel and of nuclear waste generated during decommissioning. 
In this analysis the chapter on spent nuclear fuel management only is referred to. 
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needed as part of backdoor tactics. The tactics could not be based on one option only as 
Posiva had already rejected the initiatives regarding negotiations a number of times. 
In  general  Fennovoima  refered  to  E.ON9, i.e. one of the then main shareholders of the 
company, as a resource. According to Fennovoima (2009a, 99; also 101) “Fennovoima will 
draw  on  the  extensive  nuclear  energy  expertise  of  the  E.ON  Group  in  implementing  the  
project” (NPP). E.ON was introduced as the largest private energy company in the world and 
the owner or co-owner of 21 NPP units in Germany and Sweden. Furthermore, the connection 
with  E.ON  was  also  introduced  as  a  key  to  the  development  work  of  the  Swedish  KBS-3  
model, as E.ON Nordic AB is a co-owner of SKB (2009b, 315; also Fennovoima, 2010, 39). 
This connection, which was introduced as a resource ensuring access to KBS-3 know-how 
was part of the backdoor tactics as it could be seen as an indication that Fennovoima was not 
totally dependent on Posiva in the development of final disposal. 
Fennovoima’s backdoor tactics, 40 years’ time-out, was planned for the case of the altered 
status of Olkiluoto as a common national repository. The daring tactics of Fennovoima were 
based on the assumption that the company had introduced an orthodox interpretation of the 
national solution that would hold unless the state decided to change the line of nuclear waste 
policy. Fennovoima stated as follows: 
“If political decisions are taken in the future which alter the planned Olkiluoto 
repository’s status as a common national final disposal repository for spent nuclear 
fuel, Fennovoima would still have at least 40 years to design a repository based on the 
KBS 3 method or other method that fulfills long-term safety requirements, to obtain the 
necessary permits and to build the repository before the planned final disposal 
commences.” (Fennovoima, 2009b, 316.) 
Consequently the main body of Fennovoima’s resources consisted of interpretations of 
governmental decisions regarding nuclear waste management in Finland. The objective of 
Fennovoima was to argue that the repository at Olkiluoto site was intended to be the single 
facility for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and that the repository would be a common 
national facility for nuclear power companies operating in Finland. One of the core 
                                               
9 E.ON pulled out of Fennovoima in October 2012. The media speculated whether the whole 
of the NPP project would collapse. (YLE, 24 October 2012.) 
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interpretations of Fennovoima was the claim that “in 1983 the government adopted a 
decision-in-principle regarding the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel at a single site” 
(Fennovoima, 2009a, 99). Fennovoima also stated that “decisions made to date by the Finnish 
government have set a goal of establishing a single common site and method for the 
management of spent nuclear fuel produced by nuclear power plants in Finland”  
(Fennovoima, 2009b, 316). 
Furthermore, Fennovoima presented its status regarding the organizing of nuclear waste 
management to be equal to that of TVO and Fortum. Fennovoima construed the role of Posiva 
as follows: “Posiva is a company owned by TVO and Fortum whose purpose is to manage the 
spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste from operating nuclear power plants units in 
Finland” (Fennovoima, 2009a, 100). Thus, Fennovoima appealed to the national rhetoric10 
which Posiva had consciously applied earlier when it had built confidence in the company’s 
disposal project. Fennovoima also emphasized that nuclear waste management at the 
Fennovoima NPP would be undertaken using the same methods as the NPPs already in 
operation in Finland (Fennovoima, 2009a, 99). 
Spent nuclear fuel management introduced in the Fennovoima DiP application was notified 
by Posiva as it gave a statement on the application on June 2009 (Posiva, 2009). Posiva’s 
interests were related to the status of the company itself and the status and use of the final 
disposal repository at Olkiluoto. Firstly, Posiva was concerned that the DiP application of 
Fennovoima might give the impression that Posiva was obliged to take care of SNF disposal 
generated by Fennovoima. Secondly, Posiva noted that the impression might have been given 
that the repository planned at Olkiluoto by Posiva would also be available for Fennovoima. 
Posiva  argued  that  Fennovoima’s  NPP  project  and  related  disposal  of  SNF  had  to  be  
addressed as a separate project without any connections to Posiva’s business or the repository 
at Olkiluoto. (Posiva, 2009, 1.)  Therefore, Posiva continued applying the tactics of exclusion: 
The company had nothing to do with the Fennovoima project and Fennovoima’s 
interpretations regarding Finnish nuclear waste policy were biased. Hence, Posiva was neither 
                                               
10 For example, at the end of the 1990s Posiva emphasized the viewpoint of national interest 
of taking care of final disposal of SNF generated in Finland’s NPPs as the company defined 
its own mission. Ownership of the NPPs located in Finland was carelessly introduced as 
collective and national feature. (Kojo, 2002, 41.) 
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willing to include Fennovoima in its network nor to develop a common national solution at 
Olkiluoto. 
These interests were related to the main interest, which aimed at clarifying the principles of 
Finnish nuclear waste policy. That is, that the state regulations regarding nuclear waste 
management are actor-specific. In its nine-page long statement Posiva put a lot effort into 
arguing that a national nuclear waste management programme was never established in 
Finland, a national decision on concentrating final disposal of all SNF generated in Finland at 
a single site was never taken and that according to the state there is no national solution for 
the disposal of SNF in Finland. (Posiva, 2009.) 
Therefore, the Olkiluoto repository, according to Posiva, was only for the use of its owners, 
i.e. TVO and FPH, “for so long a time period that it is ensured a safe final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel of their [owners’] NPP units which exist, is under construction and are planned”  
(Posiva, 2009, 8.) 
In the statement Posiva argued against the interpretations of Fennovoima regarding Finnish 
nuclear policy decisions. The main line of the argumentation was to indicate that decisions 
were actor-specific and no decision on a national solution or on a single disposal site had been 
taken. Posiva argued that the requirements outlined in the decision of the government in 1983 
were actor-specific as were the solutions of the companies’, i.e. TVO and IVO. Furthermore, 
Posiva pointed out that  the decision of 1983 did not obligate the companies to build a joint  
interim  storage  for  SNF,  but  both  companies  built  one  for  their  own  purposes.  Posiva  also  
argued that measures required by the state had been different. 
In the statement the establishment of Posiva was also explained to be in line with actor-
specific policy. Posiva noted briefly that the joint company had been in the interests of both 
companies in 1995. However, Posiva neither gave any further arguments nor did it explain 
how or why the situation in 1995 was different from the current situation. Posiva was in any 
case established for the benefit of the owners. The agreement on collaboration had needed 
approval by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was granted in 1995. Posiva argued 
that the application and affirmation of approval indicated that the state did not consider that 
there was a national solution in Finland for the final disposal of SNF. Posiva interpreted that 
the approval was issued specifically for inter-company collaboration based on joint demands.   
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Posiva also took a stand on paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act. The company argued 
that the aim of the paragraph was not to exempt a DiP applicant from submitting a nuclear 
waste management plan independent in relation to the other actors under waste management 
obligation. Furthermore, the aim of the paragraph was not to open the window of opportunity 
to demand the use of nuclear waste management solutions planned, financed and 
implemented by other actors. Therefore, Posiva argued that Fennovoima should introduce a 
plan of its own. 
MEE also hesitated in applying paragraph 29. A memorandum of MEE (2009b, 2) noted that 
Posiva was not a licensee under waste management obligation, but only the companies 
operating the NPPs. Therefore the MEE could not compel Posiva in accordance with 
paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act, but MEE could only compel the companies under 
waste management obligation, i.e. TVO and FPH, to collaborate with Fennovoima in 
establishing a new final disposal facility.  
Posiva and TVO repeated their arguments in the media in 2010 before the government 
granted the Decisions-in-Principle. Posiva stated that a second repository was needed for 
future energy production in Finland as the area at Olkiluoto was limited. Furthermore, Posiva 
did not want to excavate disposal tunnels underneath the NPP or the sea. However, in the 
same interview a geologist from Posiva noted that technically it was possible to expand 
underneath the sea. (YLE, 26 March 2010; also 21 April 2010.) 
Other  stakeholders  also  voiced  their  viewpoints.  Eurajoki  as  the  host  municipality  of  the  
repository reacted to Fennovoima’s plans. The municipal government of Eurajoki submitted a 
statement to Minister Pekkarinen in March 2010 as the municipality had not been consulted 
on the issue (Eurajoki, 2010). Eurajoki reminded the Minister that the host municipality of a 
nuclear facility is vested with the right of veto in accordance of the procedure of a Decision-
in-Principle and that the veto is compulsory in relation to the decisions by the Council of State 
and Parliament. This procedure was deemed to be of great importance in building openness 
and trust. Eurajoki stated that the rights of the municipality and its inhabitants regarding the 
decision-making on siting on its territory should not be violated. Especially as previous use of 
that right served as a good example. 
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If Eurajoki was cautious regarding Fennovoima’s disposal plans, the statement by the 
Ministry of Finance supported Fennovoima’s interpretation on the disposal of spent fuel at a 
single site in Finland. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance stated that as in the future nuclear 
electricity might also be produced by other companies than the owners of Posiva in Finland, 
the decisions concerning final disposal should not distort markets. Therefore the Ministry of 
Finance deemed it important that the cost-efficient disposal of SNF by others than Posiva’s 
owners should not be hindered. (Ministry of Finance, 2010, 7–8.) Thus Fennovoima’s view 
on a common site gained important political support as Jyrki Katainen, the then Minister of 
Finance and chair of the National Coalition Party had signed the statement. 
Regardless of political support for a common site, the option of two repositories also gained 
indirect  support.  STUK  had  already  submitted  the  preliminary  safety  analysis  of  the  
Fennovoima application to the MEE in 2009. The analysis referred briefly to the final 
disposal plan by Fennovoima. STUK noted that the disposal concept (KBS-3) was the same 
as the one under preparation in Finland and Sweden and hence it fulfilled the requirement set 
in the legislation. According to STUK the concept was also described enough at the DiP 
application stage. Furthermore, STUK noted that they had no information on the actual 
chances of Fennovoima disposing of SNF in Olkiluoto. STUK referred to the site selection 
and site investigations by TVO and Posiva and stated that the bedrock at Olkiluoto was not 
unique and that appropriate bedrock was available elsewhere in Finland. (STUK, 2009, 25–
26.) Right after the unofficial meeting of the government (held on 21 April 2010) but before 
the formal decision on nuclear new build, a director of STUK noted in the media that 
hundreds of candidate sites had already been identified in the 1980s. These sites only needed 
further investigation. According to the director there was no specific reason to dispose of the 
waste at Olkiluoto. (Satakunnan Kansa, 24 April 2010; see also 23 April 2010.) 
The government discussed the NPP applications unofficially on 21 April 2010 on the basis of 
the proposal by Minister Pekkarinen (MEE, 2010c). As a result, additional accounts 
concerning the final disposal of SNF were requested from Fennovoima. A director of 
Fennovoima commented that the shortage of capacity at Olkiluoto seemed to be based more 
on a tactical issue than on technical facts. She felt confident that as soon as the competition 
for the NPP licence calmed down there would be time for logical reasoning. She also referred 
to compensation for Posiva and Fennovoima’s property at Olkiluoto. (Kaleva, 22 April 2010.) 
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As mentioned in Section Two, the government issued a positive DiP on Fennovoima on 6 
May 2010. The decision included requirements for SNF management. The government 
required that within six years Fennovoima was obliged either to negotiate and sign an 
agreement with the existing licensees under a waste management obligation or to submit an 
EIA Programme concerning a final disposal repository for SNF of its own.  
The CEO of Fennovoima commented on the requirements by noting that it would make sense 
to dispose of all nuclear waste generated in Finland at the same site. He continued that if 
Fennovoima was issued a licence the company would attempt to reach agreement with Posiva 
in  a  couple  of  years,  but  if  that  failed  then  the  company  would  plan  a  solution  of  its  own.  
(YLE, 27 April 2010.) Thus Fennovoima adjusted itself to the requirements of the government 
and started to talk about a second repository as a viable option although a joint repository with 
Posiva was still the main option. In the media Fennovoima also emphasized that the company 
was  not  in  hurry  as  the  final  disposal  of  SNF would  be  topical  only  in  the  2050s  (YLE, 19 
May 2010; see also YLE, 25 May 2011). Posiva did not change its point of view or tactics. 
After the announcement of the government’s decisions the CEO of Posiva repeated that in the 
tunnels  at  Olkiluoto  there  was  capacity  for  waste  produced  by  TVO  and  Fortum  only.  
According to Posiva11 the site was limited and they did not want to expand underneath the 
sea. (YLE, 12 May 2010.) 
 
Summary 
Fennovoima still attempted to apply alliance -formation tactics but at the same time it visibly 
introduced the backdoor tactics which relied on paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act. To 
support the model of compulsory collaboration Fennovoima argued strongly in favour of a 
national solution for the disposal of SNF and a single common site. The company interpreted 
the previous decisions regarding the nuclear waste policy in Finland.  
Posiva continued to apply tactics of exclusion as it replied with counterarguments. Posiva 
defended its status as a private company implementing tasks set by its owners only. The main 
                                               
11 An interesting exception was introduced in the interview of the vice CEO of Posiva. He 
stated that there was no obstacle to going underneath the sea as not a single regulation nor 
international agreement disallowed it. According to his view excavation of tunnels underneath 
the sea was more an issue of operation. (Länsi-Suomi, 19 May 2010.) 
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line of Posiva’s argumentation was to indicate that nuclear waste decisions were actor-
specific  and  neither  a  decision  on  a  national  solution  nor  on  a  single  disposal  site  had  been  
taken. 
Furthermore, Posiva argued that the aim of paragraph 29 was not to exempt an applicant from 
submitting a nuclear waste management plan independent in relation to the other actors under 
waste management obligation. Posiva firmly rejected any plans to start negotiations with 
Fennovoima on developing a common national solution. MEE was reluctant to apply 
paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act as it was not amended according to the legislative 
procedure of the Finnish Constitution and it would have violated property rights of Posiva.  
 
4.3 Retransformed project: Towards commercial collaboration and a second repository 
The decisions by the government in May 2010 did not immediately bring the contending 
parties any closer. In September 2010 the parties met at the invitation of Minister Pekkarinen 
(Kauppalehti,  4 November 2010).  The CEO of Pohjolan Voima Oy, the biggest  shareholder 
of  TVO,  stated  that  neither  Posiva  nor  its  owners  were  going  to  start  negotiations  with  
Fennovoima on access to the repository. The CEO repeated that Posiva was for the use of 
TVO and FPH and the disposal capacity at Olkiluoto was reserved for SNF produced in their 
present and future NPP units. Although Posiva stuck to its main tactics, i.e. excluded 
Fennovoima from Olkiluoto site, there was a concession as now, according to the CEO, 
Posiva was ready to offer Fennovoima technological and other expert help on a commercial 
basis.  Furthermore,  Posiva  was  ready  to  start  investigations  with  Fennovoima  on  a  fast  
schedule. (Virkkunen, 2010.)12 
Most likely the owners of Posiva were informed that some activity by the Ministry was to be 
expected. This did indeed occur when Minister Pekkarinen urged the parties to negotiate 
seriously. Furthermore the Minister referred to the possibility of investigating the application 
of paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act with experts specialized in the Finnish 
Constitution. The Minister’s own interpretation of the paragraph was cautious, but the 
                                               
12 The letter-to-the-editor by the CEO Lauri Virkkunen was a replication of an article 
published in the newspaper Turun Sanomat the same day (Turun Sanomat, 23 September, 
2010). The article stated that TVO and Fennovoima were going to start negotiations in the 
near future on the possible joint use of Posiva’s repository.  
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implication for investigating compulsory collaboration indicated that the Ministry was 
considering a more active tactics for itself. (YLE, 7 October 2010a; 7 October 2010b.) 
According to the Minister the objective was that all  SNF should be disposed of at  the same 
site at Olkiluoto (Satakunnan Kansa, 8 October 2010). 
However, only one month later the Minister noted that he was surprised by calculations which 
indicated that building a separate facility would not necessarily be more expensive than a joint 
facility. (Kauppalehti, 4 November 2010.) A month later the Minister added that the 
establishment  of  a  joint  repository  seemed  to  be  difficult  and  that  it  is  not  a  bad  option  to  
build two repositories. (Helsingin Sanomat, 3 December 2010). Thus a policy of two 
repositories was not excluded by the Minister. This outline was partly influenced by the 
interpretation of the civil servants of the MEE who found coercion impossible (Helsingin 
Sanomat, 3 December 2010). On the other hand Minister Pekkarinen did not exclude the 
possibility that the state would apply greater pressure on the contending parties (YLE, 2 
December 2010). Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi (of the Centre Party of Finland) also 
commented on the dispute. She urged the power companies to agree on the site and noted that 
one site was enough as it surely was also the most rational solution from the point of view of 
economy and relevance. (MTV3, 5 December 2010.) Thus it seemed that the leading 
politicians13 of  the  Finnish  Centre  Party  at  this  point  still  preferred  the  option  of  the  joint  
repository although Minister Pekkarinen indicated some support for two repositories. His 
Ministry, however, was reluctant to apply the tactics of compulsory collaboration (MEE, 
2009; 2010b).  
Fennovoima disagreed with Minister Pekkarinen on having two repositories. The company 
referred to the decision by Parliament in July 2010 and argued that a joint repository would be 
beneficial for all parties. (Kaleva, 4 December 2010; YLE, 4 December 2010; Satakunnan 
Kansa, 16 December 2010.) 
                                               
13 Antti Rantakangas, Member of Parliament and vice chair of the parliamentary group of the 
Finnish Centre Party, also supported the option of joint disposal at Olkiluoto. He also worked 
for this option in the Finance Committee of Parliament. (YLE, 31 May 2010.) Timo Kalli, MP 
and chair of the parliamentary group of the Finnish Centre Party who is known for his close 
connections with TVO, pointed out that the nuclear waste of Fennovoima could end up in the 
host municipality of the new NPP unit. However, he did not reject joint disposal at Olkiluoto. 
(YLE, 27 May 2010.) 
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Negotiations on a joint repository were once again badly stuck. In March 2011 a director of 
Fennovoima confirmed that negotiations were not on-going and the parties could not even 
agree on the agenda of the negotiations. The companies had communicated only by letter. 
Posiva had offered collaboration aiming at planning of a separate repository, a proposal which 
Fennovoima had rejected. (YLE, 21 March 2011; 25 May 2011.) The director also confirmed 
that Fennovoima was not planning any alternatives as the interpretation of the politicians was 
that one disposal site was enough. Thus Fennovoima did not introduce the options outlined in 
the company’s memorandum (Fennovoima, 2010). TVO’s interpretation was that a joint final 
disposal  solution  was  required,  but  not  a  joint  disposal  site.  (YLE, 21 March 2011.) Thus, 
TVO was ready for some kind of collaboration with Fennovoima for instance consulting but 
TVO was not willing to share the Olkiluoto site. 
The option of two repositories was also supported indirectly by STUK as it announced that if 
the  option  of  two  repositories  were  assessed  to  be  unsafe  STUK  would  intervene  in  the  
planning14 (YLE, 21 March 2011). 
In the print the CEO of Fennovoima continued building up trust that collaboration with Posiva 
would be achieved and repeated the argument of Fennovoima that from the beginning the 
national solution had been the objective, meaning that all SNF produced in Finland would be 
disposed of at one site as in other countries. He claimed that the political support for the joint 
solution was strong. (YLE, 11 August 2011; also YLE, 25 May 2011.) 
The  new  Minister  of  Economic  Affairs,  Jyri  Häkämies  (of  the  National  Coalition  Party)  
commented on the dispute in autumn 2011. He applied to some extent different tactics from 
his predecessor Mauri Pekkarinen. Minister Häkämies stated that Posiva could not be 
compelled to dispose of Fennovoima SNF as coercion was difficult from the view point of 
legislation. Pekkarinen had pointed out the option of state intervention again and again 
although paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act was never applied and tested in practice. It 
seems that the Centre Party of Finland had a somewhat lower threshold for state intervention 
in the issue, i.e. coercion in accordance of paragraph 29, than the National Coalition Party, 
which is known as the most pro-nuclear party and more market-oriented in the Finnish 
Parliament. The Minister’s opinion was that other kinds of collaboration measures than 
                                               
14 In accordance of the Nuclear Energy Act STUK provides a preliminary safety assessment 
as part of DiP procedure. In practice STUK is vested with the right of veto. 
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coercion had to be looked for. If those measures were not successful then Fennovoima was 
responsible for introducing the solution. The option of two repositories was not excluded. 
Häkämies also urged the companies to negotiate and intended to start discussions in the near 
future. The previous discussions had ceased more than one year earlier. (Tekniikka & Talous, 
12 August 2011; YLE, 6 October 2011a.) 
Posiva reacted immediately to this. Posiva’s main interest persisted: Onkalo at Eurajoki was 
not a solution for Fennovoima. According to CEO of Posiva the reasons were purely 
technical. The area reserved for final disposal did not have room, due to the laws of physics 
and chemistry. However, Posiva repeated that if necessary Fennovoima could acquire know-
how  for  the  final  disposal  of  SNF  from  Posiva.  (YLE, 6 October 2011b.) The option for 
consulting was a minor concession by Posiva. Otherwise there was no sign of convergence.  
The municipal director of Eurajoki noted that Eurajoki had the right to veto the expansion of 
the repository at Olkiluoto. It was expected that the statement of Eurajoki would be asked for 
at a stage of the Fennovoima construction licence application. (YLE, 6 October 2011c.) 
In February 2012 the government intervened in the debate as it was outlined by the 
Committee on Economic Policy that the government was ready to apply paragraph 29 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act. Now Minister Häkämies stated as follows:  
“This is the Government’s message to the operators in the field: the technical 
investigations regarding final disposal should be carried out in a neutral and unbiased 
manner. After that, it will be time to make decisions. It should be possible to engage in 
cooperation if the reports show that a joint solution is feasible and the best option from 
the perspective of overall economy and safety.” (MEE, 2012a.) 
It was also required that the parties initiate the completion of the investigations required on 
collective final disposal. 
 Minister Häkämies stated that Fennovoima was required to investigate the final disposal 
solution of its own and the second option was the joint one. As the voluntary approach 
between the companies did not work, the Minister deemed it important that the government 
gave a strong signal that if necessary the Ministry would insist on studying the joint option. 
(YLE, 28 February 2012.) 
32 
 
Posiva reacted immediately and announced that the company was not going change its stance. 
According to Posiva there was no room for the nuclear waste of Fennovoima at Olkiluoto. 
CEO of Posiva stated that “This is not a political decision, but it is a purely technical issue.” 
(YLE, 29 February 2012a.) On behalf of Fennovoima the CEO noted that Fennovoima was 
confident that the parties would start a joint independent investigation of the situation at 
Olkiluoto (YLE, 29 February 2012b). In this changed situation the owners of Posiva and TVO 
appealed to safety and risks. First TVO stated in a press release as follows:  
“The current researched repository can hold 12,000 tonnes of nuclear waste and is 
located at an optimum depth of 420 metres. Posiva has no need and, for safety reasons, 
no possibility to expand the repository.  
The facility must be able to sustain earthquakes and a potential glacial period without 
compromising the safety of long-term disposal. These are essential criteria for 
determining the placement and capacity of the repository. Furthermore, for safety 
reasons, the companies are not willing to store nuclear waste in two layers or 
underneath the Olkiluoto power plant or underneath the nearby settlement. Disposal 
under the seabed has been ruled out for the same reasons. Horizontal or vertical 
positioning of the final disposal capsules makes no difference to the capacity of the 
repository. Based on the nuclear safety requirements of the final disposal facility and 
extensive deliberations, Posiva and its owners have come to the conclusion of the 
repository at its current size and location.” (TVO, 7 March 2012.) 
This was followed by the notion of the CEO of UPM pulp and paper company, one big owner 
of TVO, that it was a conscious decision of risk management by the owners not to excavate 
underneath the sea, the NPP or residential area. An extended repository might mean risks. 
(MTV3,  8  March  2012.)  Thus  the  owners  defended  the  design  of  the  repository  even  more  
firmly as the safety issue was taken up. In accordance with paragraph 29 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act the Ministry can order the licensees under waste management obligation to 
address their waste management measures collectively if safety can thereby be increased or 
expenditures substantially reduced, or other important reasons require this action. As Posiva 
could not appeal to reduced costs, attention was paid to the safety aspect. 
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In the media an estimate of expenditure was introduced by an energy technology professor of 
Lappeenranta University of Technology. The professor stated that an insignificant issue was 
exaggerated. In his view final disposal was an activity which everyone in the energy 
technology business should be able to manage for themselves. The professor estimated that a 
repository of Fennovoima’s own would cost about 1.3 billion euros. A common repository 
would save 200 to 300 million euros. This amount, according to the professor, was a pittance 
in NPP investment, which once in operation would yield about 600 million euros annually. 
The professor was amazed by the need for governmental intervention in the issue and he 
advised Fennovoima to ask for Posiva’s invitation to tender to build a repository for 
Fennovoima at an appropriate site. (YLE, 25 March 2012.) 
Another prominent person, the retired director general of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen, also 
commented on the dispute and advised the politicians to suggest returning to the issue in 20 or 
30 years. According to him there was no hurry thus there was no sense in discussing the issue 
now. (MTV3, 11 March 2012.) Although these were sporadic statements, they became part of 
the networks around the contending parties. 
The Working Group15 was established in March 2012 (MEE, 2012d). According to the 
Working Group its objective was to collect already available data in order to enable 
comparison  of  different  options  as  well  as  for  further  actions.  The  interest  of  the  whole  
Working Group could be said to be to find a mode of collaboration for Posiva and 
Fennovoima. In an interview Minister Häkämies noted that the Working Group was 
investigating whether the Onkalo of Posiva could be expanded. He excluded that the option 
that the disposal capacity reserved for the Loviisa 3 NPP unit at Olkiluoto would be allotted to 
Fennovoima. Thus the interest of Fortum regarding future final disposal was ensured. (YLE, 
29 March 2013a.) According to the minutes of the meetings, Fennovoima and Posiva were 
encouraged to engage in collaboration16 several times. However, Minister Häkämies told the 
                                               
15 The Working Group held altogether 12 meetings between 19 March 2012 and 20 December 
2012. Posiva and its owners (TVO and FPH), Fennovoima and the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy were represented in the Group. The minutes of the meetings are very sparse 
in details concerning the different issues discussed. 
16 The collaboration between the companies came up several times in the minutes. For 
example on 22 November, the chair asked about the collaboration. The parties recommended 
collaboration, but details of the collaboration needed clarifying. These details were discussed 
in the meeting, but the minutes did not include any details. 
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parties not to comment on the nuclear waste issue in the media. According to the Minister this 
was needed in order to put an end to the yes vs. no dispute. (YLE, 29 March 2013b.) The chair 
of the Working Group, representing of the MEE, also noted that the Group will not otherwise 
inform its work progress to third parties (Minutes of the Working Group, 19 March 2012). 
On behalf of Fennovoima the option of the second repository was received with satisfaction, 
but in an interview the Fennovoima director of communications refused to comment on the 
municipality of Pyhäjoki as an optional site as it had not been on the agenda and indeed was 
not considered in the land use planning of the NPP site (YLE, 14 March, 2012). The concrete 
outcomes of the Working Groups were the interim report published on 27 June 2012 (MEE, 
2012c) and the final report on 10 January 2013 (MEE, 2013). 
The Working Group agreed that the existing material should be introduced in the meetings for 
possible comparison of the options. Posiva presented their material on Olkiluoto. Posiva was 
also asked to introduce information on areas where the extension of the repository might be 
possible. The chair of the Groupstated that it was an important question whether the 
repository could be extended or not. Fennovoima announced that they had started the 
preparation of the EIA programme regarding their own repository. (Minutes of the Working 
Group, 4 April 2012). Interestingly this was not disclosed to the media, neither were the site 
selection plans introduced in the Fennovoima memorandum of 2010 (Fennovoima, 2010). 
Therefore is seems that Fennovoima started only an internal preparation for site selection17. 
The company needed to take into account the requirements set by the government, but at the 
same time the joint repository with Posiva was the main option. Public announcement of the 
preparation of a site selection process of its own might have undermined political support for 
the one single national disposal site. 
Posiva introduced its material on Olkiluoto which included planning justifications, the 
planned area, and the restrictions to be taken into consideration if the area were to be 
extended. Restrictions on a possible extension of the area were uncertainties in the rock 
                                               
17 For example, in the municipality of Sievi speculations concerning the possible site selection 
plans of Fennovoima raised concerns in summer 2012 (Kaleva, 29 July 2012). One of the five 
investigation sites which TVO studied in the late 1980s is located in Sievi. This site is the 
nearest one to Pyhäjoki, where the Fennovoima NPP is planned to be located. The issue was 
also discussed in Äänekoski, which was one of four candidate sites investigated by Posiva in 
the 1990s (YLE, 7 December 2010, updated 5 June 2012). 
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characteristics and its impact on how to place the canisters, land ownership questions, and 
planning. (Minutes of the Working Group, 23 April 2012). Posiva continued introducing its 
plan for the repository in the next meeting highlighting safety and optimizing factors. The 
restrictions to an extension in Olkiluoto were also discussed. Some possibilities could be 
found in building under the sea, but that also included certain risks. According to Posiva 
examination of the area and planning was complicated in sea areas. (Minutes of the Working 
Group, 21 May 2012.) The conclusion seemed to be that these were not very good options for 
a possible extension at Olkiluoto. 
Fennovoima introduced their plan for the forthcoming EIA programme at the Working Group. 
The planned investigations were due to start the same year. The possible siting areas had not 
yet been chosen (Minutes of the Working Group, 6 June 2012.) According to the interim 
report of the Working Group published in June 2012 Pyhäjoki as the planned location of the 
NPP unit was one of the possible sites Fennovoima was considering when preparing the EIA 
programme for a SNF repository of its own. In total the EIA programme would include half a 
dozen candidate sites. (MEE, 2012e; see also YLE, 28 June 2012). In the Working Group it 
was noted that Fennovoima needed to make a plan in accordance of paragraph 74 of the 
Nuclear Energy Degree, where the whole lifespan of the project, involving time plans, safety 
and technological examinations, site examinations, and cost estimates would be included.  
Other possible sites were also discussed and it was concluded that the feasibility studies at 
those sites had to be done again. The sites mentioned in the minutes were located at Eurajoki, 
Hyrynsalmi, Kuhmo, Loviisa, Sievi and Äänekoski. The launching of possible commercial 
negotiations was discussed, but nothing more on the matter could be found in the minutes. 
The MEE introduced Swedish plans on building underneath the sea. (Minutes of the Working 
Group, 6 June 2012.) 
The interim report of the Working Group concluded that the final quantity of spent fuel that 
would fit into Olkiluoto would be ascertained in the decades to come. It was not entirely 
certain that 12000 tons of spent fuel could be disposed of in the Olkiluoto area. Therefore the 
objective and interest of Posiva to exclude Fennovoima seemed assured already at this stage. 
MEE stated in a press release on behalf of the Working Party as follows: 
“ (…) the working group states that it can neither be proven nor ruled out whether 
more than 12,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel might be placed in final disposal in the 
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Olkiluoto bedrock section. It will take decades before the amount of spent nuclear fuel 
that can be placed in final disposal in Olkiluoto can be specified, and more precise 
information on the quality of the bedrock will only become available in surveys during 
the excavation stage of the final disposal tunnels. Therefore, it is not certain whether 
there is room in Olkiluoto even for the planned 12,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel.  
According to the working group, extending the Olkiluoto final disposal facility to 
accommodate Fennovoima’s nuclear waste (some 3,000 tonnes of uranium) would 
require a derogation from Posiva’s current research and operational principles. 
Possible surveys regarding an expansion to the Olkiluoto final disposal facility must not 
endanger the safety and operational preconditions of the current final disposal 
project.” (MEE, 2012e.) 
According to the discussion of the group, this meant that Fennovoima needed to have a 
solution of its own for the SNF in the application for a construction license. It was also unsure 
if the SNF produced by the Loviisa 3 NPP unit would fit into Olkiluoto. (Minutes of the 
Working Group, 24 August 2012.) Hence the policy option of two repositories became more 
likely. 
The Working Group discussed the criteria for a comparison of the options. It was again noted 
that the life span of the project was an important factor when making the comparison, for 
example intermediate storage was a major issue in assessing the costs. It was also noted that a 
comparison was hard to accomplish as the guiding principle was to apply existing publicly 
available information. It was proposed at the Group that the comparison would be based on 
qualitative information and it would report relative differences. Hence the evaluation of 
options as such could be a better approach than direct comparison18 between them. The chair 
concluded that Fennovoima needed to present a more thorough solution of their own for a 
final disposal repository and an estimate of safety and environmental issues. Posiva and 
Fennovoima were asked to collaborate in comparing the costs of the options. It was further 
decided that the companies should aim at collaboration. (Minutes of the Working Group, 24 
August 2012.) 
                                               
18 The word comparison was however applied in the minutes. 
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The criteria for a comparison were thoroughly discussed. Those were safety, environment, 
costs and the overall good of the society. At the meeting of 8 October the chair concluded the 
discussion on criteria by claiming that both options of the comparison were feasible. Safety 
was in his opinion the starting point, but safety would not determine the site selection. 
 Environmental issues and social issues were deemed important. The chair stated that there 
would be impacts if there were two repositories. A possible new site would entail a lot of 
effort. It seemed also problematic to find a good way to compare economic factors. More 
detailed information was needed on these factors. The overall good of the society approach 
was also discussed. The chair concluded that the national approach and solution were 
essential, not the issue of one or more repositories. (Minutes of the Working Group, 8 October 
2012.) 
The last meetings of the Working Group were concerned with finalizing the final report. The 
group wanted to submit a report which all parties of the group supported. The final report was 
published in January 2013. It assessed the environmental impacts of the various options, 
safety, costs and a review of these with respect to the overall good of the society. An 
important conclusion was as follows: When implemented in an optimal and timely manner, 
the difference in costs between different options would be insignificant compared to the life 
cycle costs of nuclear power production (MEE, 2013b).  
According to the final report the difference in costs between an extended repository at 
Olkiluoto  and  a  separate  facility  of  Fennovoima  would  be  about  0.9-1.0  billion  euros.  
However, if a separate final disposal facility were to be built in an optimal way difference in 
expenditure would only be about 0.2 billion euros. Compared to the life cycle expenditure of 
nuclear energy production the difference was deemed minor. Furthermore, the report stated 
that it was essential to utilize the experience and know-how of the entire field and to aim at an 
optimal final disposal solution. Optimization also referred to collaboration in encapsulation at 
Olkiluoto, to longer cooling periods of SNF and therefore cost-effective use of disposal 
capacity.  Instead  the  number  of  repositories,  one  or  two,  was  deemed  unessential.  The  
Working Group recommended that the companies continue negotiations on finding a solution 
for Fennovoima and noted that negotiations on a commercial basis were not within the remit 
of the Working Group. (MEE, 2013, 11–12,14–15.)  
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At the press conference the Minister of Economic Affairs Jan Vapaavuori (of the National 
Coalition Party) noted that all activities related to nuclear power were more or less 
characterized as national questions and that  the nuclear waste issue was  such a long-lasting 
solution that only the very top could wield the steering power. According to the Minister the 
commercial interests of private companies could cover decades at best, but solutions spanning 
thousands of years could not be characterized as commercial questions. The Minister also 
thanked the Working Party for turning the focus of the debate away from the number of final 
disposal sites to essential measures, i.e. planning, research and optimizing costs, in other 
words, the collaboration of the companies. (MEE, 2013c.)   
In 2013 Fennovoima announced that the company was continuing negotiations with Rusatom 
Overseas19. Later, in September 2013 when Fennovoima submitted the updated EIA 
programme to the Ministry, the company announced that “Fennovoima’s primary plan is to 
join the disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power plants currently operating in 
Finland” (Fennovoima, 2013c, 21). Furthermore, Fennovoima still stated that “Posiva is 
responsible for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland” (Fennovoima, 2013c, 21). The 
recommendations of the Working Party were referred to as follows “(…) it is purposeful and 
cost-efficient in the disposal to aim at an optimised solution and to utilise the knowhow and 
experiences evolved in the industry through the Posiva project.” (Fennovoima, 2013c, 21.) 
Otherwise the Olkiluoto site or the policy of a single common site, were no longer directly 
mentioned. 
 
Summary 
The  tactics  of  Posiva  changed  as  it  consented  to  start  negotiations  on  selling  know-how  
concerning the final disposal of SNF to Fennovoima. However, Posiva did not give up in 
relation to the status of Onkalo. The repository at Olkiluoto continued to be reserved only for 
                                               
19 In July 2013 Fennovoima announced that it had signed a Project Development Agreement 
aiming at a NPP (a VVER design) supply contract with Rusatom Overseas, a subsidiary of 
Rosatom. In addition, negotiations on Rusatom Overseas acquiring a 34% share in the capital 
of Fennovoima were carried out. Fennovoima submitted an updated EIA programme to MEE 
in September 2013. (Fennovoima, 2013a; 2013b.) 
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the  owners  of  Posiva,  meaning  the  exclusion  of  Fennovoima.  Aspects  of  the  assessment  of  
total disposal capacity at Olkiluoto seemed to be in the hands of Posiva. 
Thus Fennovoima was only partly successful. The negotiations on collaboration were finally 
started due to state intervention, but the company did not gain access to the repository at 
Olkiluoto. The Working Group recommended that the companies continue on a commercial 
basis. Hence MEE could withdraw from the role of mediator and further planning and 
implementation would be left to the companies, which concurs with actor-driven and actor-
specific nuclear policy. 
It is important to note the influence of the Working Party as a negotiation arena on the further 
development of final disposal for setting the future direction of Finnish nuclear waste policy. 
Although Parliament had required “negotiations towards a national final disposal solution 
aiming at the joint national final disposal solution which also includes the final disposal of 
spent fuel from Fennovoima NPP unit” the Working Party succeeded in outlining a policy  
allowing the option of two separate repositories in the frames of national solution. 
At this time it is difficult to anticipate the scope of future commercial collaboration between 
Posiva and Fennovoima, but on the basis of the case study it would be a surprise if 
Fennovoima became a shareholder of Posiva in the near future. It is more likely that Posiva 
will sell know-how on the site selection procedure and planning of the final disposal facility. 
However, in the future it is feasible that the companies would share an encapsulation plant at 
Olkiluoto. 
Fennovoima lost an important resource as E.ON pulled out of the NPP project in October 
2012. At the same Fennovoima lost its connection to the KBS-3 research and development 
activities, which was one of the main arguments in the final disposal of SNF in the DiP 
application of 2009. Access to KBS-3 know-how via E.ON had also been the foundation of 
the backdoor tactics of Fennovoima in case of failure in the negotiations with Posiva on a 
joint repository. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Socio-technical challenges can be characterized as “situations and issues where the 
relationship between the technical and social components is still unstable, ambiguous and 
controversial, and were negotiations are taking place in terms of problem definitions and 
preferred solutions”  (Bergmans  et  al.  2012,  p.3).  In  this  case  study  we analysed  the  debate  
and negotiations on the development of the joint final disposal of SNF in Finland. The 
challenge emerged as the nuclear power company Fennovoima started planning its NPP and 
SNF management in 2007. 
The case study indicates the challenges related to a siting process in a company-driven 
implementation policy where one site for final disposal of SNF has already been approved, 
but a new power company wants to join and expand the existing disposal project. Due to the 
conflicting interpretations regarding the foundation of the Finnish nuclear waste policy the 
principle  of  national  solution  was  shaked.  The  case  study  also  indicates  how  the  socio-
technical challenges of the siting controversy are addressed by establishing a negotiation 
arena which is open for the main actors only.    
The objective of the paper was to analyse the interests, resources and tactics of the key actors, 
i.e. Posiva, Fennovoima and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, negotiating the 
development of “national solution”. From the beginning Fennovoima applied tactics of 
alliance formation. It attempted to start collaboration with Posiva, first on a voluntary basis, 
but then also by arguing that the MEE could compel the parties to collaborate. It was in the 
interests of Fennovoima to ensure access to the national solution on the final disposal of SNF 
and hence to support its owners’ NPP project. Fennovoima also attempted to persuade Posiva 
by referring to compensation and by appealing to the piece of land Fennovoima controlled in 
the vicinity of the Olkiluoto disposal site. Hence, the tactics of persuasion were applied. Later 
Fennovoima’s tactics became somewhat harder and even arrogant as the company became 
frustrated due to continuous rejections by Posiva. Fennovoima perceived that a policy 
decision on a national solution aiming at a common single site at Olkiluoto had been taken in 
Finland. Hence, paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act was an important resource for 
Fennovoima, especially as many politicians also seemed to support the interpretation of a 
single common disposal site. 
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Posiva applied tactics of rejection and exclusion. First Posiva defended its identity as a private 
company and the status of the final disposal facility at Olkiluoto as an activity of its owners 
only, which could not be nationalized for national interests. Posiva introduced 
counterarguments concerning the principles of Finnish nuclear waste policy and argued that 
the regulations were actor-specific. Later Posiva also appealed to the lack of space, and to 
safety and risks in excluding Fennovoima from Olkiluoto. Finally Posiva changed its tactics 
and  agreed  to  start  negotiations  on  collaboration,  but  most  likely  due  to  its  expertise  in  
assessing the information concerning the limitations of the Olkiluoto site it succeeded in 
defining the final disposal options in such a way that the company managed to reserve 
Olkiluoto only for its owners. 
MEE involuntarily assumed the role of a mediator between the conflicting parties and urged 
the companies to start negotiations voluntarily, but these tactics of non-intervention failed. 
Even though the ministers implied that the state could intervene in the dispute, MEE was 
reluctant to resort to force in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act. Finally the Ministry 
succeeded in getting the parties around the same table. It seems that the interpretation of the 
Ministry of Justice of paragraph 29 of the Nuclear Energy Act changed the situation. The 
Working Party established, however, interpreted the request of Parliament concerning the 
national solution in such a way that the policy option of two separate repositories became the 
most likely one. 
Therefore the principle of national responsibility for nuclear waste management was re-
interpreted. Instead of a common single site, optimization and timing were emphasized in the 
frames of commercial collaboration of the licensee under waste management obligation. In 
the future the licensees could collaborate in encapsulating SNF in one facility but finally 
disposing of it at two different sites in Finland. 
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